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EDITOR'S NOTE: A forclul movement for revision of the New Mexico Constitution
exists in the state today. Official action includes work of the Constitutional Revision
Commission. The following Article is the third of a series on revisions of the New
Mexico Constitution.
THE LEGISLATURE
DENNY 0. INGRAM, JR.*
A prior article' serves as a companion to this article in that the
philosophical basis discussed therein serves herein. A quick review by
the reader of the early portion of the prior article would be helpful.2
Once again, the author's purpose in large part is a review of the
proposals of the New Mexico Constitutional Revision Commission.'
And, again, their work product is praiseworthy.
I
THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS
Two great errors mark state legislatures. First, power which
should be assigned to the legislature rests within the sovereignty of
the people. Second, legislatures are degraded by restrictions evidenc-
ing public disrespect and distrust.
The two great errors not only utterly smash the ability of the leg-
islatures to enact certain needed legislation but they also supply the
catalysts for irresponsibility and for abuse of trust.
As for irresponsibility: If power is denied in some important
areas to the extent that approval of the electorate must be sought,
the responsibility for the matter can be shifted to the people. This
shift can be based upon actual votes on matters presented to the peo-
ple and upon supposition as to their votes if a matter had been pre-
sented to them. In addition, the referral of some non-basic matters
to the people because of specific requirements therefor will lead to
referral of other non-basic matters though not required. The result
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. Pro-
fessor Ingram was a member of the Texas House of Representatives, 52nd Legisla-
ture (1951-52).
1. Ingram, The Executive, 7 Natural Resources J. 267 (1967).
2. The gist of the philosophical-governmental principle is: Two axioms underlie
good American government. First, the power to act vigorously is indispensable to
effective government. Second, governmental power should not be concentrated in
one person or body of persons. The second axiom is the synthesis of a congeries of doc-
trines and theories, the cardinal ones being separation of powers, checks and balances,
the federal system, sovereignty of the people or government of laws, and republican
form of government.
3. The Commission has published two reports, one in 1964 and the other in 1967.
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is an element of irresponsibility in the legislature. Accordingly, ef-
fective use of a republican form of government is minimized; and
the sovereignty of the people is exerted upon non-basic matters.
These are non-basic matters which the electorate as a group often
cannot adequately judge and certainly can never judge in any sort of
a vigorous manner, thus providing a direct onslaught against the
axiom that governmental power to act vigorously is indispensable to
effective government.
As for abuse of trust: Lengthy and detailed constitutions "show
distrust by the people of their own Legislatures; but such distrust
will breed unworthiness. Of such nature . . . are the curious re-
strictions upon the passage of bills, and the elaborate constitutional
provisions against corruption or abuse of official power." 4 The pic-
ayunish limitation on pay,' the limitation as to days in a session, 6
and the limitation to biannual and special sessions, 7 even though ad-
mittedly the preference of many legislators because of the part-time
nature of their offices, do reflect largely the electorate distrust of
the legislature and do create abuse of trust. The abuse of trust is a
result of the degradation some legislators feel imposed upon them
and a result of the difficult financial circumstances and time pres-
sures under which service must be rendered.
At the nation's birth, the power of the state legislatures was im-
mense.' Since then, erosions of the power have occurred,9 often as
justifiable rebellion against the quality of personnel the offices at-
tracted. Sometimes, the erosions were merely the result of the po-
litical philosophy of the times, e.g., the long-lived era of Jacksonian
democracy. It seems logical also that the various causes and the re-
sults thereof fed upon one another until the present plight evolved.
Disregarding the cause, the continuance of the matter is insup-
portable if state government is to progress; for the legislature, per-
haps second only to the present status of the executive, is at a low
ebb of respect, efficiency, and effective power.
The two great errors respecting legislatures create fundamental
problems repeated throughout state government. Vigor is reduced
unnecessarily by misapplications and overapplications of the doc-
4. F. Stimson, Federal and State Constitutions of the United States 70 (1908).
5. N.M. Const. art. 4, § 10.
6. N.M. Const. art. 4, § 5.
7. Since 1964, the New Mexico constitution has provided annual sessions of a
limited nature, N.M. Const. art. 4 § 5.
8. See, W. Graves, American State Government 188 (4th ed. 1953).
9. Id at 189.
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trines and theories underlying the axiom that power should not be
concentrated. Surely, the sovereignty of the people is nowhere so
overexercised than it is with respect to legislative power; this results
in constant referral of questions to the people because of constitu-
tional provisions. A republican form of government seems more
avoided than sought. A weakened legislature means a weakened gov-
ernment and hence ineffectiveness in the state's role in federalism,
ineffectiveness in the application of the doctrine of separation of
powers, and ineffectiveness in the application of the theory of checks
and balances.
The two great errors probably could be accompanied by a third
great error-poor organization of the legislature. However, since
it appears that the first two errors lead to the third, they are consid-
ered dominant and should be considered the great errors creating
the fundamental problems.
II
THE IMPACT OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT DECISIONS
The reapportionment decisions1" espousing the rule of equality in
legislative representation of the vote marked for obliteration one of
the greatest barriers to governmental progress-legislative appor-
tionment weighted toward the population status of far earlier years
and toward representation of aged election districts such as counties
or groups of counties having a community of interests. Prior to those
decisions and the sequential statutes, New Mexico was no exception
to malapportionment." Details of the local situation will be left to
the cited publications and the reader's recall of the matter as re-
ported by news agencies in recent times.
Prior to the recent remedial legislation, all state legislative ap-
portionment provisions contained a common fault: the rural areas
received greater representation per voter than did the urban areas.
In each state, less than a majority of the voters could elect a ma-
10. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964)
(Colorado); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia); Maryland Committee
for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland) ; WMCA, Inc. v.
Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York) ; and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(Alabama).
11. A complete story of the matter and a record of the enactment of the remedy,
together with extensive statistical material, appears in R. Folmar, New Mexico Legis-
lative Council Service, Legislative Apportionment in New Mexico 1844-1966, August 1,
1966. See also, R. McKay, Reapportionment: The Law and Politics of Equal Represen-
tation 377 (1965). See also the citations in McKay at p. 380.
[VOL. 8
THE LEGISLA TURE
jority of the legislators. 12 During 1961 in New Mexico 14% of the
population could elect a majority of the senate; and 27% of the
population could elect a majority of the house of representatives.3
In a report covering 47 of the state senates and 46 of the state
houses, there were only three state senates and seven state houses
with more disproportionate representation than New Mexico. 4
Presently, a majority in the New Mexico senate can be elected by
45.7 % of the population; and a majority in the New Mexico house
can be elected by 46.3 % of the population."5 Since exact mathemati-
cal equality is impossible, a reasonable solution seems to have oc-
curred; certainly, fantastic progress has been made in comparison to
the 1961 figures.
There is patent injustice in a minority consisting of rural inhabi-
tants imposing its will upon a majority consisting of urban inhabi-
tants. Perhaps there is also an element of injustice in an urban ma-
jority imposing its will upon the rural minority, but there is at least
a lessened magnitude in the injustice and an observance of the funda-
mental democratic principle of equality of representation on the ba-
sis of individual vote power. No one has yet conceived a system
whereby a democratic society can avoid some neglect of minority
groups no matter how strong the constitutional protections may be.
The answer lies only in such realms as education, persuasion, and
civilized recognition of fair play; a mathematical guide for achieve-
ment appears impossible in the light of present knowledge.
Rural and urban communities have diverse interests, needs, prob-
lems, and standards as well as the customary tendencies to preserve
self-interests. These divergencies coupled with malapportionment in
favor of the rural community resulted in ignoring some of the critical
urban needs. Rural legislators were either ill-equipped to meet the
urban problems or were too selfish to meet the urban problems.
Hence, the cities could not look to the state government to answer
needs the cities could not answer alone. This disregard for urban
needs meant the worst kind of lack of vigor in the exercise of gov-
ernmental power. The cities thus had to take, in varying degrees,
two simultaneous routes: the up-grading of municipal government
and the obtaining of federal aid directly without first asking state
12. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Apportionment of
State Legislatures A-7 (1962).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. R. Folmar, New Mexico Legislative Council Service, Legislative Apportionment
in New Mexico 1844-1966 137 (1966).
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aid and without the use of the state government as a medium. Ac-
cordingly, the states were weakened because the cities and the na-
tional government served part of what should have been, or at least
might have been, state functions. Obviously, the iniquitous effects of
the rural dominated legislatures are not limited to localized effects
of friction between the rural and urban communities. Federalism
also took a shuddering assault. The doctrine of separation of powers
and the theory of checks and balances suffered in operation because
of a poorly constituted and prejudiced legislature which was either
too weak or too strong, depending upon the voter's view. Certainly,
the republican form of government became the vehicle for violating
democratic precepts of equality in voting power. Even legislative ap-
peals to the sovereignty of the people in the form of constitutional
amendments were unrepresentative requests because of the legisla-
tive constituency.
The impact of reapportionment is simply this: All the foregoing
mischiefs of malapportionment are subject to elimination or mini-
mization within a reasonable time. Some matters, for example, the
basic injustice of unequal representation, already have been cured as
completely as is likely. Other matters will require gradual erosion of
the product of years of errors. 6 But, the agent for change exists.
One writer since the reapportionment decisions declares:
It has been the theme of this volume that the Reapportionment Cases
have opened the way for revitalization of representative democracy
in the United States at the national, state, and even local levels. The
requirement of substantial equality among election districts is a matter
of the first importance .... 17
Although reapportioned fairly at present, the issue of malappor-
tionment is not thereby silenced forever. Reapportionment should
be made anew following each decennial census. A framework must
be provided so that the matter is not attended by court action in
order to compel legislative action. If the legislature fails to act,
there must be some other authority responsible to the people of the
entire state so that fairness promptly can prevail. In addition, the
equality of representation must not be tainted by gerrymandering.
Apparently the Constitutional Revision Commission of New Mexico
has foreseen these problems; for it proposes Article IV., Section 3 :
16. See Graves, supra note 8, at 197; and R. Connery and R. Leach, The Federal
Government and Metropolitan Areas 199 (1960) for discussions of the posture of the
matter prior to reapportionment.
17. McKay, supra note 11, at 269.
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For the purpose of electing members of the legislature, and subject
to such limitations as are set out in this article, the state shall be di-
vided into as many senatorial districts and representative districts as
may be provided by legislative enactment. Each district shall consist
of compact and contiguous territory.
Each representative district and each senatorial district shall be
substantially equal in population to the population of other districts
for the same respective houses of the legislature. In determining the
population of each district, inmates of such public or private institu-
tions as prisons or other places of correction, hospitals for the insane or
other institutions housing persons who are disqualified from voting
by law shall not be counted.
At the regular session next succeeding each decennial census the
legislature shall reapportion the senate and the house of representa-
tives giving due regard to affording each citizen of this state with a
vote substantially equal in voting strength of that of every other citi-
zen of the state.
If the legislature at the next regular session following a decennial
census fails to enact a reapportionment plan as provided herein, or
should such a plan be found invalid by the state supreme court, the
governor shall immediately appoint a reapportionment commission
consisting of five members, not more than three of whom shall be
members of the same political party. Within ninety days following its
appointment, the commission shall submit its reapportionment plan,
prepared in accordance with this article, to the state supreme court for
its approval as to legal sufficiency and compliance with this article.
Such plan as finally prepared by the commission and finally approved
by the supreme court shall become law immediately upon being filed
by the commission with the officer prescribed by law. If any such re-
apportionment plan shall be found to be invalid by the state supreme
court, the reapportionment commission shall be directed to prepare a
new plan meeting the requirements of this article. The state supreme
court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction in reapportionment
controversies. (See American Bar Association Journal, September
1964, "Reapportionment of State Legislatures," R. W. Nahstoll,
Pages 842-847.) 18
Note that the instigator of the remedy if the legislature fails is
the governor, an official elected by and responsible to the statewide
electorate. Note too the requirement of "compact and contiguous
territory." This provision, coupled with the customary constitu-
18. 1964 Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission of New Mexico 7 (1964).
See also McKay, supra note 11, at 270.
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tional safeguards should plainly bar gerrymandering. The gerry-
mandering evil has produced this comment:
The unprecedentedly large amount of redistricting has given rise to
charges of gerrymandering for partisan advantage. In Delaware,
Michigan and New York suits were brought on these grounds in
1964-65. On November 2, 1965, the Michigan Supreme Court up-
held the complaint, ruled the existing apportionment invalid, and di-
rected the state apportionment commission to submit a new measure
in early 1966. No court, it appears, had ruled previously on this ques-
tion, although the U. S. Supreme Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot
(364 U.S. 399) in the early 1960's indicated a willingness to set
aside a districting which denied voting rights to minorities. 19
III
REAPPORTIONMENT AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS
The impact of reapportionment upon the fundamental problems
discussed above deserves particular mention. Recall the asserted two
great errors marking state legislatures: First, power which should
be assigned to the legislature rests within the sovereignty of the peo-
ple. Second, legislatures are degraded by restrictions evidencing pub-
lic disrespect and distrust. Obviously, the remedy of these two great
errors will be hastened by reapportionment although certainly not
solved thereby. The legislature now having a fairer apportionment,
the people, particularly urbanites, should be more willing to unleash
retained powers and confer greater respect. Clearly, partial remedy
of these two great errors should be expected as a concomitant of the
elevated quality of the legislature expected to result from reappor-
tionment. Necessarily, the change will be not only partial but also
will be slow, even imperceptible in the early stages.
IV
RECOMMENDED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER
The constitutional provisions for an excellent legislative branch
of state government are:
A. Either unicameralism or bicameralism.
B. Annual sessions of reasonable length.
19. The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States 1966-1967 39 (1966).
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C. Attention to the following items with respect to the member-
ship:
1. Election in such a manner that important issues are em-
phasized and that there is fair representation of the
electorate.
2. A total number of legislators based upon such consider-
ations as efficiency, economy, manageability of the house
size, and size of the electorate represented.
3. A reasonable term in office, giving due consideration to
the terms of other officials and the need for periodic ex-
pressions of the electorate's will.
4. Privileges and immunities sufficient to insure fearless
conduct by legislators.
5. Adequate compensation.
D. Broadly outlined legislative procedure.
E. Legislative powers of broad magnitude without recourse to
electorate approval.
F. Particularized roles designed, at least in large part, to imple-
ment the theory of checks and balances. Such roles to include:
1. A major and informed role in adoption of the budget.
2. A powerful investigative role with respect to executive
conduct.
3. Post audit authority well implemented.
4. Overriding the gubernatorial veto by a process which
duly regards the veto.
V
DETAIL OF THE RECOMMENDED LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
AND SUPPORT THEREFOR
A. Either Unicameralism or Bicameralism
Unicameralism is the equal of bicameralism, if not the superior.
Past criteria for comparing the two legislative forms must be
modified in view of the recent apportionment decisions and statutes.
Primarily, one no longer can point to different bases for determining
the membership of the house and senate as a method of assuring
representation of regional interests and representation of sheer
numbers. The reapportionment decisions and statutes declare that
numbers alone is the base permitted. Hence, if heretofore equilib-
JANUARY 1968]
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rium in merit existed between unicameralism and bicameralism, as
some argue, there is now a preponderance on the side of unicameral-
ism. However, substantial doubt can be raised as to the prior exist-
ence of such an equilibrium. The true state of the matter most often
has been a division in the sense of many favoring unicameralism and
many favoring bicameralism, with a shift in favoritism perhaps need-
ing more impetus than that produced by the reapportionment event.
The state of the matter prior to reapportionment has been summa-
rized as follows:
The opinions of the people who ought to know vary widely; in
fact, they are often diametrically opposed. A large majority of po-
litical scientists favor unicameralism, while an overwhelming ma-
jority of persons with actual legislative experience are opposed to it. 2°
Accordingly, it seems inappropriate to argue that there has been a
recognized position which reapportionment has clearly changed; for
there have been varying positions probably for varying reasons
which may or may not have included two bases of representation.
The matter simply must be discussed anew with the argument of two
bases for computing representation being eliminated as an argument
supporting bicameralism.
A compendium of the most important arguments 21 favoring one
or the other legislative systems, giving due regard to the reappor-
tionment decisions, is now in order.
Points favoring bicameralism:
1. Two houses provide an internal check upon the use of the
legislative power and thus help assure impassioned, thorough action.
2. Bicameralism has withstood the test of time in 49 state gov-
ernments and in the national government.
3. It is more difficult to corrupt two houses than one; hence,
lobbies will find it more difficult to obtain enactment of desired leg-
islation.
4. Departure from the traditional bicameral legislature would
entail numerous new laws or amendments to old laws grounded upon
20. Graves, supra note 8, at 193.
21. For some other possible arguments see Public Administration Service, 3 Consti-
tutional Studies (Alaska) Ch. X (1955) ; Zeller, American State Legislatures 50 (1954) ;
and Willoughby, Principles of Legislative Organization and Administration 213 (1934).
See also these discussions written since the reapportionment decisions: Note, Unicamer-
alism and Bicameralism: History and Tradition, 45 B.U.L. Rev. 250 (1965) ; D'Alem-
berte and Fishburne, The Unicameral Legislature, 17 U. of Fla. L. Rev. 355 (1965).
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bicameralism and would entail a re-education of the electorate.
These matters would create expense and confusion.
5. There is less chance that a bicameral legislature tyrannically
can expand its power because it is more difficult to concentrate power
divided between two houses.
6. Bicameralism permits the use of different office terms, thus
providing an upper chamber which has more experience and a lower
chamber which is more attuned to the electorate's desires.
7. Bicameral legislatures offer good training grounds for poli-
ticians in that more diverse situations arise and larger numbers of
legislators are generally employed.
8. Specialized functions with accompanying expertise and tradi-
tion can be accorded each of two houses.
Points favoring unicameralism:
1. A single chamber can act more vigorously.
2. The single chamber works successfully. For example: in Ne-
braska; in 17,995 out of 17,997 municipalities in the United
States ;22 in innumerable state and federal agencies exercising legisla-
tive functions; and in analogous business governing bodies such as
corporate boards of directors.
3. Two houses provide camouflage of responsibility for failure,
delay, misrepresentation, and other fault; one house does not pro-
vide such a camouflage.
4. There is no need for the secretive, powerful, small, and
sometimes easily controlled conference committee to resolve differ-
ences between two houses on legislation.
5. A unicameral legislature is easier to follow in its operations
than is the complex bicameral legislature; this means that the press
can make better information available to the public.
6. A unicameral legislature is more efficient than a bicameral
legislature because of its simpler organization and of the depth to
which its members may consider legislation because there is no ur-
gency to pass the matter to another house for its consideration.
7. A unicameral body is more economical to staff and operate
than is a bicameral body.
22. Note, Unicameralism and Bicameralism: History and Tradition, 45 B.U.L. Rev.
267 (1965).
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8. The friction produced by rivalry between two houses does not
exist.
9. The prestige of the legislative office is enhanced.
10. It is easier to control one house of a bicameral legislature
and thus prevent good legislation than it is to control the entire leg-
islature represented by a single house.
There are many other arguments on the subject, but most are re-
finements, details, or subsidiaries of the foregoing.
Logically, unicameralism presents a better case for good govern-
ment than does bicameralism. On the other hand, the tradition of
bicameralism is so well formed that a change indeed would be diffi-
cult to achieve. As noted, most legislators oppose unicameralism ;23
and such opposition is probably more emphatic in legislatures which
have just weathered the problems of redistricting malapportioned
legislatures and necessarily combining districts of some incumbents.
To further eliminate legislators as a result of unicameralism would
be a difficult chore to perform. Hence, the members of the legisla-
ture pose a probable formidable force against unicameralism. That
is to be expected not only for the obvious reason of a threat to office
existence but also because of the required learning of new ways, the
loss of the camaraderie and esprit of the individual houses generated
in part by the good-hearted rivalry between them, the customary
fear of the unknown, and the usual apathy toward institutional
change, particularly if there be no great demand therefor or over-
whelming case therefor. The reaction of the voters is apt to be
somewhat like that of the legislators unless there is a strong educa-
tional campaign. Various pressure and lobby groups will certainly
resist change and doubtless will exert great effort to prevent any
change.
So, the added problem of selling unicameralism detracts from its
preferred position. Nevertheless, at this point of consideration in
New Mexico, the matter should not be concluded against anything
apparently so meritorious as unicameralism. The matter should be
submitted alternatively for consideration by the prospective consti-
tutional convention. There, unicameralism can be presented more
publicly and either could be eliminated if unfavored or if deemed
detrimental to the passage of the new constitution as a whole or
could be proposed to the electorate as the proper enactment. At the
least, the Constitutional Revision Commission should have by com-
23. See Graves, supra note 8, at 193.
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ment recognized that the merits of unicameralism and bicameralism
are approximately equal.
B. Sessions
Presently, in New Mexico, regular legislative sessions are held
annually with the sessions in odd-numbered years being 60 days long
and the sessions in even-numbered years being 30 days long.24 The
shorter sessions are limited to consideration of financial matters,
bills answering special requests of the governor, and bills vetoed in
the last regular session. Special sessions not to exceed 30 days may
be called by the governor, and he must call such a session upon three-
fifths of the legislators certifying as to the need therefor.25 If the
governor alone calls the session, the subject matter is limited to ob-
jects specified in the call.26 The proposed constitution provides regu-
lar sessions of 60 days in odd-numbered years with power in the leg-
islature by two-thirds vote to provide for annual sessions not to ex-
ceed 60 days. 27
What then should the Commission recommend?
The sessions should be of reasonable length with some discretion
as to the time being vested in the legislature itself. Short limits on
the session length assumes at the outset that the legislature will
waste time unless given a definite ending time. Of course, this just
creates another problem-ill considered legislation because of too
short a time limit. In fact, many legislation problems will never be
considered because of the time limitations. Thirty days certainly
seems too short for an outer limit; 60 days would seem to be the
shortest time worthy of any consideration. The trend is toward no
limits or limits of 120 days or more. Considering the time required
to organize the houses, particularly since the president pro tempore
of the senate will serve the role formerly held by the lieutenant gov-
ernor, the case for a longer limit becomes obvious. Furthermore,
most legislators will have just been elected in even-numbered years
and, like the governor, need time to organize their plans. Part of
this problem can be cured by commencing the sessions later, such as
in early March, but the new legislators still need to meet and become
acquainted with one another and the procedures involved. It should
24. N.M. Const. art. 4, § 5.
25. N.M. Const. art. 4, § 6.
26. Id.
27. 1967 Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission, Proposed N.M. Const.
art. 4, § 5.
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be kept in mind that the turn-over in legislators is very high in most
states and New Mexico is typical. It would seem that an unlimited
session or a session of not more than 120 days would be reasonable.
If less time is needed, the session can adjourn earlier. To place a
more confining restriction on the legislature would be an expression
of distrust and would jeopardize chances for calm legislative orga-
nization and deliberation. Much of the objection to long sessions
can be found among legislators themselves who desire to shorten
services being performed at pauper's rates.18 New Mexico is one of
the nation's lowest paying states with respect to legislators.29 This
objection can be remedied by the payment of at least a moderately
adequate compensation as discussed below.
The legislature should convene annually. The legislature is the
equivalent of a board of directors or municipal council. One cannot
imagine a major corporation or a city of any size convening its gov-
erning body once every two years or as emergency special sessions
are deemed necessary. State government in New Mexico is New
Mexico's biggest business, a business in which all are concerned; and
it is folly to believe that there is either efficiency or economy involved
in failing to permit legislative action annually. Needed reforms,
budgetary investigations, exchange of ideas, amendments of out-
moded laws, and many other such matters need attention to the ex-
tent that annual sessions are absolutely necessary to excellence in
state government. New Mexico is a small state, but it has most of
the problems of larger states-each set of uniform laws can be util-
ized by New Mexicans, each new tax or expenditure in any state re-
quires about the same consideration, and continual attention to these
and related matters is essential to maintaining a high level of state
government. Furthermore, each annual session of the legislature
should not be limited in what it considers except as the legislature
shall determine. If the legislature is to be effective, it must have the
power that comes with freedom of action.
Of course, there will be an occasional need for special sessions
despite the fact that the legislature meets annually. A provision
essentially like the present one should suffice.
Accordingly, the legislature should meet annually in early March
for a session not to exceed 120 days with the legislature being free
28. N.M. Const. art 4, § 10 provides compensation of $20.00 per diem while in
session.
29. See n. 19, supra at 48.
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to consider such matters as it deems fit. Provision much like the
present one should be made for the calling of special sessions.
Such provisions would go far toward correcting the two great
errors in state government as discussed above and hence serving in
a better manner the two axioms underlying the structure of state
governments.
C. Membership
1. Election
The major question concerning election of legislators has been
resolved by the apportionment provisions discussed heretofore.
Perhaps only one other point deserves consideration. As with most
state offices, the constitution presently and as proposed provides that
the office holder must be a qualified voter. Voting qualifications how-
ever, are rather severe-residence in the state one year, the county
90 days, and the voting district 30 days."' This is almost an absurd
requirement, particularly since it also applies to other state offices.
To assume that a person should be ineligible to be a legislator be-
cause he has moved, perhaps just across the street, from one of
many voting districts in his county to another is consummate error.
In multi-county districts, moving from one county to another should
impose no barrier to legislative or other state office. Of course, some
prerequisites to qualified voting status must not be ignored, such as
felony status. But, the proposed procedure should be avoided despite
the ease and simplicity of its use. The voting requirement should be
modernized. This is particularly true in view of the great mobility
of the nation as a whole not only in communication of views but in
constant shifting of families from one locality to another, and with-
out the loss of intellect.
2. Number
The number of legislators in each house should be large enough to
provide close contact with the electorate and should also be small
enough to provide for ease of organization and operation. An in-
spection of the proposed constitution demonstrates that these prin-
ciples. are well served."' Especially is this true when one considers
the size and population of the state and the numbers in other state
30. N.M. Const. art. 7, § 1.
31. 1967 Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission, Proposed N.M. Const.
art. 4, § 2.
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legislatures. The proposed constitution calls for a senate of from 32
to 40 members and a house of from 72 to 100 members. Since the
reapportionment legislation of 1966 used 42 senators3 2 and the
increase is very little, the Constitutional Revision Commission
should revise its 1964 and 1967 recommendations to fit the existing
facts. There appears to be no reason why it should not do so. Fur-
thermore, similar considerations are due the house size which is
now 70 members pursuant to the 1965 house reapportionment legis-
lation.3 In any event, the matter should be set forth in constitutional
form rather than continuing to rely upon statutory reform brought
about by the apparent federal unconstitutionality of the existing
state constitutional provisions. If a unicameral legislature is chosen,
the matter must be re-examined. There are 43 legislators in the
Nebraska single chamber., 4
3. Term
The present35 two-year term for representatives and the present
six-year term for senators is retained in the proposed consti-
tution,36 and there seems no reason for any change in the bicameral
legislature. However, if a unicameral legislature is utilized, the prob-
lem of terms will arise. Although some continuity might be interrupt-
ed, it appears that the electorate will insist upon two-year terms for
the traditional reason of close control over legislative conduct. In
view of this, there seems little need to discuss the matter further.
4. Privileges and Immunities
Various legislative prerogatives are often criticized, particularly
with respect to immunity from suit or prosecution for floor or com-
mittee conduct. Of course, these prerogatives can be abused and are
sometimes abused for purely personal advantage or protection.
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Revision Commission wisely re-
tains the basic provisions.3 7 The legislators must be free to act natur-
ally in pursuit of the common good, and the possibility of error must
be recognized and taken in stride. However, it would seem that the
32. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-9-13 to 2-9-63 (Supp. 1967).
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-7-14 to 2-7-37 (Supp. 1967).
34. Neb. Const. art. 3, § 1.
35. N.M. Const. art. 4, §4.
36. 1967 Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission, Proposed N.M. Const.
art. 4, § 2.
37. 1967 Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission, Proposed N.M. Const.
art. 4, § 12.
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legislature, perhaps even pursuant to constitutional authorization,
should be free to provide compensation to any individual unjustly
damaged by remarks or other conduct rendered immune by the con-
stitutional protection of legislators. Any wrong suffered in this
manner should be borne by society as a whole and not by a hap-
hazardly injured party.
5. Salaries
The legislature has often sought an increase in the $20.00 per
diem provision of the New Mexico constitution, the latest defeat
being on September 28, 1965, by a vote of 39,922 to 13,087.8 It
provided:
Each member of the legislature shall receive as per diem expense
the sum of not more than twenty dollars ($20.00) for each day's
attendance during each session, and ten cents ($.10) for each mile
traveled in going to and returning from the seat of the government
by the usual traveled route, once each session as defined by Section
5, Article IV of this Constitution, and in addition, two hundred
dollars ($200.00) a month for each month he is a member of the
legislature.8 9
If New Mexicans have any complaints about their legislature
after that parsimonious measure was defeated by their degrading
vote, then they should be answered that they receive better govern-
ment than they deserve. Such a vote reflects no appreciation of the
economic facts, of the effort and time spent by most legislators, and
of the importance of the office. General Motors Corporation pays
its office boys more than members of the New Mexico legislature
are paid. No union employee in America would stand for such treat-
ment. True, people resent legislators voting themselves raises. Also
true, people think that part-time jobs deserve small pay. However,
the machinery is established in such a manner that only legislators
can initiate raises for legislators; and those part-time legislative jobs
consume more time and interrupt more personally productive effort
than the average voter can conceive. Furthermore, any legislator
should be paid enough so that he can and will devote the needed
time to the matter.
The Constitutional Revision Commission recommends that the
constitutional restrictions on pay be removed and that the matter
38. N.M. Const. art. 4, § 10 (Supp. 1967).
39. N.M. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1965) at p. 14.
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be resolved by statute.4° This is admirable and is essential to excel-
lent state government. However, there should be consideration given
to the setting of the compensation by the constitution until the legis-
lature has had time to act. The discouragement of good men by
lack of compensation for even one term is a damaging event. In view
of the responsibility, time, expense, and related matters involved
plus the compensation paid in progressive states, a minimum com-
pensation of $5,000.00 per year should be enacted. Bear in mind
that the lobby and pressure groups willing to use ulterior devices
more readily can corrupt legislators who are underpaid and bearing
the direct and indirect degradation resulting therefrom.
D. Procedure
Although certain basic protections against abuse of legislative
procedure should be engrafted in the constitution, the legislature
should be left free to name the requisite details. Otherwise, the elec-
torate will not have delegated sufficient power to effectuate fully
the republican form of government or to express respect and trust
of the legislators.
The present New Mexico constitution is so restrictive in what may
be termed the procedural aspects of the legislature, that it would be
a fair waste just to enumerate the restrictions. They vary from a
provision on the exact number of such inferior officers as sergeant-
at-arms and the authority to hire such employees as janitors and
stenographers 41 to provisions on more important subjects as con-
tempt of the legislature,42 the manner of passing bills,43 and the
form of bills.44
The proposed New Mexico constitution couples the procedural
and related matters to the fundamentals properly belonging within
a constitution. Proposed Article IV., Section 7 is the cardinal pro-
vision:
Each house shall be the judge of the election and qualifications of
its own members. A majority of either house shall constitute a quorum
to do business in that house, but a lesser number may effect a tem-
porary organization, adjourn from day to day, and compel the attend-
ance of absent members.
40. 1967 Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission, Proposed N.M. Const.
art. 4, § 10.
41. N.M. Const. art. 4, § 9.
42. N.M. Const. art. 4, § 11.
43. N.M. Const. art. 4, § 17.
44. N.M. Const. art. 4, §§ 15 and 16.
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Each house may determine the rules of its procedure, punish its
members for contempt or disorderly behavior in its presence, and pro-
tect its members against violence. Each house may, with the con-
currence of two-thirds of its members, expel a member, but not a
second time for the same act. Punishment for contempt or disorderly
behavior or by expulsion shall not be a bar to criminal prosecution.
Continuing, there is a provision for a call to order by some statu-
torily designated officer until the speaker is elected ;45 a brief but
broad provision for the selection "of its own officers and employees
." and the fixing of their compensation;46 simple provisions for
the traditional keeping of records, 47 establishing committees, 48 pre-
paring bills according to a prescribed form,49 and passing bills.50
The proposed provisions omit a mass of detail which could only
interfere with honest legislative effort and which evidences a distinct
distrust of the legislature. The only thing remaining for the legisla-
ture to be in top order after the enactment of the proposed provi-
sions is the adoption of statutes and rules."'
E. Legislative Powers
The present New Mexico constitution, not only in the legislative
article but also elsewhere, like most state constitutions, impresses
fantastically detailed restrictions upon legislative action. So, many
governmental decisions that could be made in a competent exercise
of the republican form of government must be made instead by
constitutional amendment or by following rigid guidelines. Often,
surely, some needed legislation is simply ignored because of the
problems attending enactment. There is simple and fundamental
language in the first sentence of Article IV., Section 1 : "The legis-
lative power shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives
which shall be designated the legislature of the state of New Mexico,
and shall hold its sessions at the seat of government." Nevertheless,
a 500-word, more or less, paragraph follows in the same section and
45. 1967 Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission, Proposed N.M. Const.
art. 4, § 8.
46. Id. § 9.
47. Id. § 14.
48. Id. § 16.
49. Id. § 17.
50. Id. § 18.
51. Detailed recommendations can be found in W. Willoughby, Principles of Legis-
lative Organization and Administration (1934), an older but thorough book sponsored
by the Institute for Government Research of the Brookings Institution.
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provides a referendum procedure for the nullification of certain
types of legislation. Then, in Article IV., Section 2 as originally
enacted: "In addition to the powers herein enumerated, the legisla-
ture shall have all powers necessary to the legislature of a free
state." It would seem that Section 1 would have sufficed, but at least
Section 2 as originally enacted was a simple restatement of the gen-
eral legislative power. However, in 1960, Section 2 was amended by
a 150-word plus amendment to provide an express constitutional
provision to the effect that the legislature had the power to enact
laws to guarantee the continuance of the government in a "disaster
emergency" and the continuous meeting of the legislature during the
same. Thenceforward in the legislative article, minute detail creat-
ing rigidity in the laws is the decided theme. The major prejudices
of various groups or times are fundamentally asserted. There is also
an abundance of other articles bearing upon legislative power, par-
ticularly in a restraining manner or in a usurping manner. It appears
plausible that not even municipal governments are so confined as is
the New Mexico legislature by the present constitution. If the
United States had taken such an attitude toward its constitution,
the Mexican flag probably would fly over New Mexico to this day.
The Constitutional Revision Commission's curative work on the
legislative article and other provisions bearing upon legislative
power will have an enormously helpful effect if enacted. The Com-
mission's theme is direct; the broad statement of legislative power
is employed and most all other statements are dropped. In the main,
the statement of the power is reduced in proposed Article IV.,
Section 1, to this:
The legislative power shall be vested in a legislature which shall
consist of a senate and house of representatives and which shall hold
its sessions at the seat of government.
The legislative power shall extend to all rightful subjects of legisla-
tion not inconsistent with this constitution or the constitution of the
United States.
A state's constitution should be an instrument from which the
legislature can find power to attain the ideas of its members, to
realize aspirations founded upon desires to serve and govern well,
and to give the vigor government needs. It should not be a series or
conglomeration of needless restraints or violations of the sound
principles of republicanism. The protective devices of separation of
powers, checks and balances, ultimate sovereignty within the people
('VOL. 8
THE LEGISLATURE
at the polls, and the constitutional protection of due process and its
requirement of reasonableness along with many other protective
measures, including the honesty of capable men attracted to office by
the respect and trust of their fellows, serve well to protect the popu-
lace. So, the legislature should be unchained as the Commission
effectively recommends. 5 2
F. Particularized Roles (Checks and Balances)
1. Budget
The legislature must have a most thoughtful role in the state
budget. However, the matter should not be covered by specific con-
stitutional provisions; and the Constitutional Revision Commission
wisely has not so done. The governor formulates and proposes the
budget; the legislature analyses it, exposes it to public view, and acts
thereon. To do this it needs nothing other than the general and
broad legislative powers already discussed.
2. Investigation
An uninformed legislature is avoided by use of legislative aids pro-
vided by statute and by the constitutional power of investigation.
The constitutional power is implicit in the legislative power, and the
Constitutional Revision Commission's elimination of much of the
deadwood and rigidness of the constitution with respect to the legis-
lature has made certain that there is nothing to hamper this impor-
tant legislative role. Weakness in this legislative power would
greatly detract from the ability of the legislature to act its part in the
application of the theory of checks and balances, for this is an effec-
tive weapon against overstepping of any other branch, particularly
the executive, in interims between legislative action on appropri-
ations.
52. One could consume bales of paper writing on inadequate delegation, initiative,
referendum, and related matters; but it would be a repeat or summary of writings and
speeches of the past. Let references suffice: See the argument of U.S. Rep. Charles F.
Scott of Kansas in 1911 wherein he argues for representative government and against
direct legislation of the electorate through initiative and referendum. He made a great
speech, and it is recorded in IX. Great Debates in American History 489 (1913). At p.
482 of the same work see a contrary argument by Senator Jonathan Bourne of Oregon
made in 1910. The general subject is discussed in C. Beard, American Government and
Politics 506, 515, 517 (5th ed. 1929) ; Fairchild and Seibold, Constitutional Revision in
Wisconsin, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 201, 223 (1950) ; and in W. Graves, American State
Government 142 (4th ed. 1953).
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3. Audit
Presently, there is no post audit provision in the New Mexico
constitution. The Constitutional Revision Commission recommends:
"The legislature shall, by joint resolution, appoint an auditor to
serve at its pleasure. The auditor shall conduct post-audits as pre-
scribed by law, and shall report to the legislature and to the
governor."53
Fifteen states have a similar provision.14 If the legislature is to
be responsible for the investigation of financial fault and proper
protection of the state's funds which will be paid out largely by the
executive department, it must be in a position to audit the accounts
of these persons and agencies handling the money. This necessitates
an auditor owing his allegiance to the legislative branch.
4. Overriding the Veto
The veto should be duly regarded as a voice from one who repre-
sents the state-wide interest. Therefore, overriding the veto should
occur in a manner giving due regard to the veto's meaning. Such due
regard first results from the nature of the veto. That has been
discussed earlier,"5 and it should be recalled that the line veto does
exist. The line veto, when used, focuses attention well. A blanket
veto carries usually a greater impact but not one so incisive as the
line veto. Due regard of the veto also results from the required
legislative action needed to override the veto. Generally, something
other than a simple repassing of the measure seems called in
answer. The present constitution requires a two-thirds vote to over-
ride the veto: 6 and the proposed constitution wisely contains a
similar provision,57 thus assuring due legislative regard for the veto.
53. 1967 Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission, Proposed N.M. Const.
art. 4, § 21.
54. See 1967 Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission 43 (1966).
55. Ingram, The Executive, 7 Natural Resources J. 268, 289 (1967).
56. N.M. Const. art. 4, § 22.
57. 1967 Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission, Proposed N.M. Const.
art. 4, § 20(c).
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